

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Case No. 8:25-cv-01419-JVS-JDE Date April 13, 2026
Title Salma Nasoordeen et al v. County of Orange et al

Present: The Honorable **James V. Selna, U.S. District Court Judge**

Elsa Vargas

Not Present

Deputy Clerk

Court Reporter

Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs:

Attorneys Present for Defendants:

Not Present

Not Present

Proceedings: **[IN CHsAMBERS] Order Regarding Motion for Preliminary Injunction [34]**

Plaintiffs Salma Nasoordeen (“Nasoordeen”) and Hasna Aini (“Aini”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) move for a preliminary injunction against Defendants County of Orange and Don Barnes, in his official capacity, (collectively, “Defendants”). (Mot., Dkt. No. 34.) Defendants opposed. (Opp’n, Dkt. No. 37.) Plaintiffs replied. (Reply, Dkt. No. 38.)

For the following reasons, the Court **GRANTS** the motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Nasoordeen and Aini wear hijabs as part of their religious practice. (Declaration of Salma Nasoordeen (“Nasoordeen Decl.”), Dkt. No. 34-2, ¶ 3; Declaration of Hasna Aini (“Aini Decl.”), Dkt. No. 34-3, ¶ 3.) Being seen without hijabs by men outside of their immediate families, including via photographs or video, is a violation of their religious beliefs. (Id.)

On May 15, 2025, Plaintiffs were arrested by the Orange County Sheriff’s Department (“OCSD”) at a peaceful student-led demonstration at the University of California, Irvine. (Nasoordeen Decl. ¶ 7; Aini Decl. ¶ 6.) Plaintiffs were transported to the Orange Country Intake Release Center (“IRC”). (Id.)

OCSD policy requires that photographs be taken of all arrestees booked into an Orange County Jail and stored electronically. (See RJN, Exs. 5, 6, 9, 10.) At the time of Plaintiffs’ arrest, OSCD Policy 2015.3 stated that “[r]eligious head coverings may not be

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Case No. 8:25-cv-01419-JVS-JDE Date April 13, 2026

Title Salma Nasoordeen et al v. County of Orange et al

worn during the booking photo process.” (See Ex. 1 (former OCSD Policy 2015.3(g)).)

Upon arrival to the IRC, a female deputy demanded that Nasoordeen remove her hijab for her booking photograph. (Nasoordeen Decl. ¶ 10.) Despite the female deputy erecting a divider for privacy, Nasoordeen observed a male deputy visible through the glass. (Id. ¶¶ 10–11.) When Nasoordeen asked why it was necessary to remove her hijab, she was told the faster she complied, the faster she could be released. (Id. ¶ 12.) Nasoordeen removed her hijab and was photographed. (Id. ¶ 14.)

When Aini arrived at the IRC, she was placed in a holding area with other arrestees, including men. (Aini Decl. ¶ 8.) A female deputy observed that Aini’s hijab was not secure and proceeded to remove and refasten the hijab in the view of the male arrestees. (Id.) Aini was also forced to remove her hijab for photographs twice. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 11–12.)

Nasoordeen and Aini were subsequently released. (Declaration of Nathan Wilson (“Wilson Decl.”), Dkt. No. 37-1, ¶ 9.) Since Plaintiffs were arrested, OCSD has updated its policies to permit Muslim women to keep their hijabs on during their booking photos. (Id. at 5–6; see RJN, Ex. 11 (“If the inmate objects to removing their headwear based on their sincerely held religious belief, . . . [t]he inmate will be permitted to wear the headwear for the booking photo in a manner that allows the inmate’s face to be fully visible.”))

Photos taken during booking are stored in OCSD’s computer system and are accessible to OCSD staff. (Mot. at 1.) Orange County jail facilities are also equipped with continuously-recording video surveillance systems. (See RJN, Ex. 2, 7.) OCSD policy enables any staff member to request footage captured by these surveillance systems. (See RJN, Exs. 3, 7.)

Plaintiffs filed suit on June 30, 2025, alleging, amongst other claims, violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). (Compl., Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiffs claim that Defendants violated their religious freedom “by forcing them to remove their hijabs, recording photos and potentially video, and maintaining those images accessible to men.” (Mot. at 6.) Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction under their RLUIPA claim enjoining Defendants from (1) maintaining their images

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Case No. 8:25-cv-01419-JVS-JDE Date April 13, 2026

Title Salma Nasoordeen et al v. County of Orange et al

without hijabs¹ in such a way that they are accessed by men and (2) releasing their images without hijabs to the public. (Id.; see Mot. at 2.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. *Preliminary Injunction*

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a) governs the issuance of preliminary injunctions. On an application for a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff has the burden to establish that (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) he is likely to suffer irreparable harm if the preliminary relief is not granted, (3) the balance of equities favors the plaintiff, and (4) the injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right. Id. (citation omitted).

In the Ninth Circuit, the Winter factors may be evaluated on a sliding scale: “serious questions going to the merits, and a balance of hardships that tips sharply toward the plaintiff can support issuance of a preliminary injunction, so long as the plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the public interest.” Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1134–35 (9th Cir. 2011). To satisfy the irreparable injury element, plaintiffs must “demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22 (citations omitted).

B. *Request for Judicial Notice*

Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, the Court may take judicial notice of matters of public record if the facts are not “subject to reasonable dispute.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2001); see Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). The Court takes judicial notice of the documents in the Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”) pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 201. All of the documents in the RJN contain facts that “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be

¹“Images” includes photographs, video footage, or any other visual recordings of Plaintiffs without their hijabs. (See Reply at 13 n. 11.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Case No. 8:25-cv-01419-JVS-JDE Date April 13, 2026

Title Salma Nasoordeen et al v. County of Orange et al

questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Request for Judicial Notice

Plaintiffs filed a request for judicial notice (“RJN”) in support of this motion. (See RJN, Dkt. No. 34-1.) Specifically, Plaintiffs seek judicial notice of the following:

1. Portions of the OCSD Custody and Court Operations Manual pertaining to certain OCSD policies that were operative at the time of Plaintiffs’ arrest and detention on May 15–16, 2024. (RJN, Dkt. No. 34-1, Ex. 1–6.)
2. Portions of the current OCSD Custody and Operations Manual. (RJN, Dkt. No. 34-1, Ex. 7–11.)
3. Policies or public notices from other government agencies regarding religious head coverings and photographs. (RJN, Dkt. No. 34-1, Ex. 12–14.)

The Court finds that all of the documents for which Plaintiffs seek judicial notice are matters of public record that are not subject to reasonable dispute. See Lee, 250 F.3d at 688–89; Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Furthermore, the documents contain facts that “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). Accordingly, the Court **GRANTS** Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice of RJN Exhibits 1–14.

B. Winter Factors

1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

RLUIPA prohibits the government from “impos[ing] a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution . . . unless the

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Case No. 8:25-cv-01419-JVS-JDE Date April 13, 2026

Title Salma Nasoordeen et al v. County of Orange et al

government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person – (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). To establish a likelihood of success under RLUIPA, a plaintiff must first show that the challenged policy or practice implicates her religious exercise and substantially burdens that exercise. See Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 360–61 (2015). Then, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the policy or practice is “in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest” and is “the least restrictive means of furthering” that interest. Id. at 362. RLUIPA “shall be construed in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g); see also Holt, 574 U.S. at 358.

a. Substantial Burden

A substantial burden on a religious exercise occurs when the state places “substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.” Jones v. Slade, 23 F.4th 1124, 1142 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 2005)). Plaintiffs argue that their religious exercise was substantially burdened when Defendants created and maintained images of them without their hijabs, knowing they may be accessed by men outside of their immediate families. (See Mot. at 8.)

Deputies’ requirement that Plaintiffs remove their hijabs during booking was consistent with the OCSD policy in effect at the time, stating that “[r]eligious head coverings may not be worn during the booking photo process.” (RJN, Ex. 1 (former OCSD Policy 2015.3(g)).) But Defendants argue that Plaintiffs were not required to do so in the presence of men. (Opp’n at 8.) In fact, Defendants claim that they actively accommodated Plaintiffs’ religious concerns by having female deputies conduct the booking and use a privacy divider. (Id. at 8–9.) Any claim that Plaintiffs were in view of men is a factual issue. (See id.)

However, the issue here is not the contemporaneous presence of men. The question is whether Defendants’ act of taking and storing the images of the Plaintiffs without their hijabs, knowing they would likely be seen by men, substantially burdened Plaintiffs’ beliefs. (See Reply at 3.) Plaintiffs also argue that given the proliferation of surveillance cameras in the IRC, it is likely that at least one camera, if not several,

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Case No. 8:25-cv-01419-JVS-JDE Date April 13, 2026

Title Salma Nasoordeen et al v. County of Orange et al

captured footage of the Plaintiffs without their hijabs. (Mot. at 10.) These burden of these images last beyond the moment of capture: OCSD personnel retain access to the images, and under California law, a sheriff’s office has discretion to post booking photos on its website or to requesting members of the public. (Id. at 9–10; see RJN Exs. 3, 5–7, 9, 10); Op. Atty. Gen. 03-205 (2003), 2003 WL 21672840, *4.

The Court finds that Defendants placed substantial pressure on both Plaintiffs to remove their hijabs for photos and videos. When their photographs were taken, both women described feeling coerced into removing their hijabs because they were at risk of further detention. (See Nasoordeen Decl. ¶ 14; Aini Decl. ¶¶ 8, 11.) For example, when the deputy told Nasoordeen that she removed her hijab, the faster she could leave, (see Nasoordeen Decl. ¶ 12), the suggestion was that Nasoordeen would remain in custody for longer if she did not comply. Additionally, Aini did not consent to removal of her hijab in a communal and recorded space when the deputy removed and refastened it. (See Aini Decl. ¶¶ 8, 11.) Plaintiffs need not prove that these images and videos have been viewed or disseminated for the Court to find that their religious beliefs were burdened. See e.g., Omeish v. Kincaid, No. 1:21-CV-0035, 2021 WL 2447834, at *5 (E.D. Va. June 15, 2021) (“The ongoing availability of [the plaintiff’s] images [without a hijab] constitutes a substantial burden on her religious tenets.”); Chaaban v. City of Detroit, No. 20-CV-12709, 2021 WL 4060986, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 7, 2021) (finding plaintiff alleged a valid RLUIPA claim based on defendants’ substantial burdening of her religious exercise “by requiring [her] to remove her hijab to be photographed” and “by creating a permanent public record of that image which has been and could continue to be released to the public”); Al-Kadi v. Ramsey Cnty., No. CV 16-2642 (JRT/TNL), 2019 WL 2448648, at *10 (D. Minn. June 12, 2019) (determining that a reasonable jury could find that RLUIPA was violated when defendants took a photo of the plaintiff without a hijab).

Nonetheless, Defendants argue that RLUIPA no longer applies to Plaintiffs because they are no longer in custody. (Opp’n at 10 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) (describing that the statute applies to “a person residing in or confined to an institution. . . .”))) Given that Plaintiffs are no longer subject to OCSD or IRC policies, Defendants claim there is no ongoing conduct that pressures Plaintiffs to violate their religious beliefs. (Id.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Case No. 8:25-cv-01419-JVS-JDE Date April 13, 2026
Title Salma Nasoordeen et al v. County of Orange et al

Although Plaintiffs are out of custody, the availability of these images and videos stem from the initial violation: photographing and recording Plaintiffs without their hijabs, knowing that resulting images could be accessed by men. (See Reply at 3 n.2.) Courts have entertained RLUIPA claims following a plaintiff’s release when the violation stems from conduct during custody. See, e.g., Choudhry v. Cnty. of Tulare, No. 1:21-CV-01287 KJM SAB, 2025 WL 2687942, at *1, 19 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2025) (denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the RLUIPA claim requesting destruction of photographs taken of the plaintiff without her hijab during her brief incarceration); Chaaban, No. 20-CV-12709, 2021 WL 4060986, at *2, 4 (finding that plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief was not moot, despite her release from custody, because defendants continued to maintain images of her without her hijab). Defendants fail to present any contrary legal support. (See Reply at 2–3.)

Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have properly alleged and offered evidence in support of their claim that they experienced a substantial burden to their religious beliefs under RLUIPA.

b. Compelling Government Interest

Defendants next bear the “heavy burden” of showing that their actions furthered a compelling governmental interest and were the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. See Fox v. Washington, 71 F.4th 533, 536 (6th Cir. 2023). Defendants claim that photos of detainees serve the government’s interests in safety and integrity of the criminal justice system by aiding law enforcement in accurately tracking, classifying, monitoring, and releasing inmates. (Opp’n at 11.) They claim that removing head coverings serves these interests by ensuring that the inmate’s identity is not obscured and that the inmate is not concealing any weapons. (Id. at 11–12.) Further, Defendants claim that the maintenance of the photographs and footage is necessary to support future investigative needs—as well as defend against Plaintiffs’ claims in this action. (Id. at 13.)

Even if the Court finds these interests compelling, the Court cannot find that Defendants’ actions were the least restrictive means of furthering them. The Ninth Circuit requires a defendant to show that “it has actually considered and rejected the efficacy of least restrictive measures before adopting the challenged practice.”

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Case No. 8:25-cv-01419-JVS-JDE Date April 13, 2026

Title Salma Nasoordeen et al v. County of Orange et al

Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 999 (9th Cir. 2005). Defendants have not even attempted to make such a showing. (See Opp’n at 11–14; Reply at 6). And Defendants cannot. OCSA later adopted a less restrictive policy, allowing inmates to wear their religious headwear for the booking photo. (See RJN, Ex. 11.) The Court finds that this updated policy indicates that the old policy was more restrictive than necessary to further the stated interests.² (See Reply at 6–7.) Further, given that other law enforcement agencies permit religious head coverings in booking photographs, Defendants cannot convincingly argue that removal is required to further governmental interests of safety, security, and monitoring. (See Mot. at 10, 12; Exs. 12–14 (containing various sheriff departments’ religious head coverings policies).)

Because Defendants imposed a substantial burden on Plaintiffs’ religious exercise in a manner that was not the least restrictive means to further the governments’ interests, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their RLUIPA claim. Thus, the first Winter factor is satisfied.

2. Irreparable Harm

A moving party must show that irreparable harm absent injunctive relief is “likely,” not merely “possible.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22; All. for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1135. “Issuing a preliminary injunction based only on a possibility of irreparable harm is inconsistent with [the Supreme Court’s] characterization of injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22 (citing Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam)).

Plaintiffs claim that the mere availability of these images to men outside of their immediate families constitutes harm. (Mot. at 12.) Defendants counter that this future harm is merely speculative, not likely. (Opp’n at 14.)

²Defendants challenge reference to this policy amendment as an inadmissible remedial measure under Federal Rule of Evidence 407. Fed. R. Evid. 407; (Opp’n at 13–14). But Rule 407 is inapplicable at this stage of the proceedings—and further, the updated policy shows feasibility of a less restrictive alternative, not culpable conduct. (See Reply at 7.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Case No. 8:25-cv-01419-JVS-JDE Date April 13, 2026

Title Salma Nasoordeen et al v. County of Orange et al

First, Defendants claim there is no evidence that it is likely that booking photographs will become publicly available or disseminated. (*Id.* at 15.) The Court is not assured by Defendants’ statement that “the Sheriff’s Department does not provide booking photographs to the public in response to informal requests or even a formal Public Records Act request.” (Wilson Decl. ¶ 11.) Although Cal. Penal Code § 13665 limits sheriff’s departments from publishing mug shots on social media, OCSD can legally post mug shots on their own site or respond to Public Records Act requests. *See Op. Atty. Gen. 03-205* (2003), 2003 WL 21672840, *4. Beyond Assistant Sheriff Wilson’s declarations, Defendants do not offer any policy or legal authority suggesting that OCSD abides by narrower rules regarding public release of booking photos.

Regardless, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are currently harmed by law enforcement’s access to the photos. (*See Reply* at 9); *see Hodges v. Thomas*, No. CV-22-00132, 2023 WL 2725447, at *8 (D. Ariz. Mar. 3, 2023) (“To obtain a mandatory preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must demonstrate ongoing harm or the present threat of irreparable injury.”). Today, all sworn OCSD personnel, which include men, can access images of the Plaintiffs without hijabs. (*See Reply* at 8; RJN Exs. 7, 9, 10; Wilson Decl. ¶ 11.) Defendants claim that there is no evidence that the images or surveillance videos have been viewed, accessed, or disseminated by parties other than those necessary to this litigation. (*Opp’n* at 10–11.) The Court notes that under Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs, having their images without hijabs viewed by unspecified “parties necessary to this litigation” is a concrete harm. (*See Reply* at 12 n.9.) Further, Plaintiffs need not show evidence that these photos have been viewed to succeed on showing that irreparable harm is likely. Given Defendants’ statements that booking photos and surveillance footage are necessary for maintaining records of past and current inmates, as well as supporting future investigatory needs, the Court finds it likely that OCSD may view Plaintiffs’ images to carry out their work.³ (*See Opp’n* at 11–13). *Cf. Carribbean Marine Services Co., Inc. v. Baldrige*, 844 F.2d 668, 675 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding no irreparable harm because there must be “[m]ultiple contingencies that must occur before [the plaintiffs’] injuries would ripen into concrete harms”). Lastly, Plaintiffs describe present emotional distress as a result of knowing that men outside of their families *can*

³Defendants suggest the likelihood of access is low because personnel have to search to access the photos; they cannot passively stumble across them. (*See Opp’n* at 16; Wilson Decl. ¶ 11.) But this design choice does not so attenuate the possibility of harm as to make it less than likely.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Case No. 8:25-cv-01419-JVS-JDE Date April 13, 2026

Title Salma Nasoordeen et al v. County of Orange et al

access these images. (See Mot. at 12.) Thus, the harm to Plaintiffs is neither conjecture nor speculation. Cf. Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla. Ent. Mgmt., Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 1250 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[S]peculation on future harm . . . does not meet the standard of showing ‘likely’ irreparable harm.”).

The Court agrees with Defendants that this harm is different from those alleged in standard RLUIPA claims in which preliminary injunctions are granted. (See Opp’n at 17–18.) In most cases, plaintiffs are incarcerated and the alleged harm interferes with their ability to practice their religion while in custody. (See id.); see, e.g., Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 1001–02 (finding irreparable injury when an inmate was forced to deny his own religious beliefs by following the California Department of Corrections’ grooming policy). But this distinction does not negate the ongoing harm to Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs through the maintenance of the images. (See Reply at 11; Opp’n at 18.) Courts recognize that ongoing harms stemming from an initial violation during custody are worthy of injunctive relief. See Omeish, No. 1:21-CV-0035, 2021 WL 2447834, at *4 (denying dismissal of prospective injunctive relief for a plaintiff who was required to remove her hijab for her booking photo in part because “[t]he availability of her images to law enforcement agencies and the public constitutes ‘an ongoing harm’ from which she is suffering”); Al-Kadi v. Ramsey Cnty., No. CV 16-2642, 2019 WL 2448648, at *16 (D. Minn. June 12, 2019) (finding that, for an inmate plaintiff photographed without her hijab, “a request to enjoin conduct that was limited to [plaintiff’s] time in detention is undoubtedly moot,” but an injunction to redact her images before public release is not moot because “a cognizable danger of future violation exists”) (citations omitted).

Therefore, the Court finds that the second Winter factor is met.

3. Balance of Equities and Public Interest

To prevail on a motion for preliminary injunction, a party must show that the “balance of equities tips in [its] favor.” All. for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1131 (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 20). A court “must balance the competing claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested relief.” Amoco Prod. Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987); Winter, 555 U.S. at 24. Plaintiffs must also demonstrate that the proposed injunction would serve the

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Case No. 8:25-cv-01419-JVS-JDE Date April 13, 2026

Title Salma Nasoordeen et al v. County of Orange et al

public interest. Winter, 555 U.S. at 24. These inquiries merge when the Government is the opposing party. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009).

If preliminary injunctive relief is denied, Plaintiffs will be harmed by the accessibility of these photos to men outside of their immediate families, as well as the accompanying emotional distress. (See Mot. at 12.) If preliminary injunctive relief is granted, Defendants claim they will be harmed because such a ruling will undermine the value of inmate records by compromising their reliability. (See Opp'n at 19–20.) The Court finds that Plaintiffs' sought relief is narrow: it only applies to their images, not Defendants' broader practices of storage and access to booking photos and surveillance footage. (See Reply at 11.) Defendants fail to specify why a preliminary injunction modifying only access to Plaintiffs' images would harm them. Defendants claim both that the images are not at all used in their routine practices, yet also that redacting them or limiting their access would compromise their evidentiary value. (Compare Opp'n at 15 with id. at 19.) Defendants cannot have it both ways.

Lastly, the Court agrees that a preliminary injunction serves the public interest because such relief is in line with RLUIPA's construction as "a broad protection of religious exercise[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g); see also Holt, 574 U.S. at 358.

Therefore, the third and fourth Winter factors weigh in Plaintiffs' favor.

C. Bond

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c), after obtaining a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff must post a bond in an amount that would pay the costs and damages sustained by another party in the event that the court later determines that the bond should not have been issued. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). Plaintiffs claim no bond is necessary because Defendants will suffer no monetary damages. (Mot. at 14.) Because Defendants do not oppose this argument, the Court will not require Plaintiffs to post a bond.

IV. CONCLUSION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Case No. 8:25-cv-01419-JVS-JDE Date April 13, 2026

Title Salma Nasoordeen et al v. County of Orange et al

Finding all Winter factors satisfied, the Court grants a preliminary injunction enjoining Defendants from (1) maintaining Plaintiffs' images without hijabs in such a way that they are accessed by men and (2) releasing their images without hijabs to the public. To carry out this injunction, Defendants are ordered to redact the hair, neck, and ears in the images, as well as restrict access to the original images such that they are only viewable by the necessary members of the trial teams. Defendants are also ordered to update the Court within seven days on the steps they have taken to carry out the Court's injunction. Plaintiffs are invited to respond within five days thereafter in the event they find that the Defendants have not adequately redressed their harm.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court **GRANTS** the motion.

IT IS SO ORDERED.